Lectures on Reflexive Game Theory, 2010
Introduction
Chapter 1. Sets, Boolean algebras, exponential formulae, and equations
1.1. Sets
1.2. Boolean algebras
1.3. Exponential formulae
1.4. Equations
Chapter 2. Complete graphs with sides of two types
2.1. Main definitions
2.2. Theorem on total stratification
Chapter 3. Decomposable graphs, polynomials, and diagonal forms
3.1. Theorem of decomposition
3.2. Graphs and grammatical trees
3.3. Polynomials and diagonal forms
Chapter 4. Basic model
4.1. A general schema
4.2. Representation of the subject
4.3. Representation of a group
4.4. Examples of analysis
4.5. The principle for prohibition for selfishness and the model formalism
4.6. The actions that are always chosen and the actions that are never chosen
Chapter 5. Theorems of variety
5.1. The first theorem of variety
5.2. The second theorem of variety
Chapter 6. Extension of the basic model
6.1. Non-decomposable graphs of relations
6.2. Individual sets of actions
6.3. Individual graphs of relations
6.4. Influences that the subject is aware and not aware of
Chapter 7. Superactivity
7.1. Superactive subjects
7.2. Superactive groups
7.3. Theorem of superpassivity
Chapter 8. Paradox of a peacemaker
8.1. Specifying concept of influence
8.2. A conflict between two groups of two subjects each
8.3. A conflict of one subject with a group of two subjects
8.4. A conflict of two subjects
8.5. Generalization
8.6. A case of two peacemakers
Chapter 9. Reflexive control
9.1. Manipulation by influence
9.2. Manipulation by changing relation
9.3. Manipulating with the order of significance
9.4. Reflexive control by influencing subconsciousness
Chapter 10. Personal relations
10.1. Son, mother, father
10.2. Escape from jail
10.3. Theft
10.4. The chief and the award
Chapter 11. Social processes and politics
11.1. Choice of economic system
11.2. Appointment of premier-minister
11.3. City gangs
Chapter 12. International relations
12.1. Year 1941
12.2. Hungary, 1956
12.3. Iranian crisis, 2006
12.4. Analysis of frustration
Chapter 13. Military decisions
13.1. Intuition and the model predictions
13.2. Choosing a root
13.3. Reflexive control
Chapter 14. Theorem of justice
14.1. Ideal trial
14.2. Trial without defender
Conclusion
Appendix
Problems and Exercises
Answers and Explanations